This article proposes a redesign of the Medicare inpatient prospective payment system to reduce payments made to hospitals with high complication rates. We compute riskadjusted, expected complication rates for hospitals and compare them to actual complication rates in order to determine the number of excess complications. Hospital payment reductions then are computed based on the number of excess complications in a hospital. Medicare hospital payment could be reduced by approximately 8% ($8.5 billion) if hospitals were held to a ''best practice'' standard and if payments made for excess complications were eliminated.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) required Medicare to eliminate hospital payments resulting from certain inpatient complications, referred to as hospital-acquired conditions (HACs). Its passage established a pay-for-performance model that is based upon an outcome of care as opposed to a process of care. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) defined 11 types of complications as HACs for fiscal year (FY) 2009. These HACs are excluded from Medicare severity adjusted diagnosisrelated groups (MS-DRGs) during assignment, thereby eliminating any payment increase associated with an HAC.
Excluding every occurrence of an HAC from MS-DRG assignment implies that HACs are always preventable. Such a strict standard severely limits the number of post-admission complications that can be considered HACs. Indeed, CMS has estimated that HACs impact only .017% ($20 million) of Medicare inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) payments (CMS 2008) . As a result of this strict standard, high-volume post-admission complications such as pneumonia and septicemia are not included in post-admission complications considered HACs. The HAC policy is further restricted by failing to recognize the link between patient susceptibility to an HAC and patient severity of illness at the time of admission. Taken together, these issues ensure that HAC policy is limited to those complications that are virtually always preventable. No new complications were added to the HAC list in FY2010.
As we demonstrate, including complications that are not always preventable, such as pneumonia and septicemia, would expand the number of discharges that might be considered as receiving payment for HACs to more than 10% of all discharges. A fundamental change in HAC payment policy therefore is necessary to broaden the quality agenda to address the spectrum of preventable hospital complications that fall outside current policy.
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has proposed a readmission payment policy that would ''reduce payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates'' (MedPAC 2008) . The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-148) requires CMS to begin reducing IPPS payments in 2012 to hospitals with high readmission rates. This payment approach for readmissions is analogous to that required for complications. Clearly, most complications are not always preventable. Thus, an HAC policy that determines payment reductions based upon a hospital's excess number of complications-as determined by comparing a hospital's actual complication rate to its riskadjusted complication rate (i.e., expected complication rate)-avoids requiring a direct link between the payment reduction and the absolute preventability of a complication for an individual patient. The use of a riskadjusted threshold, over which a complication rate would be deemed in excess, would replace a mentality of ''this should never happen'' with a more realistic attitude-''this has happened too often''-and thus sidestep the argument as to whether an individual has received lowquality care.
The PPACA establishes ambitious cost containment and quality improvement goals while expanding access to the uninsured. This article demonstrates that a substantial portion of current payments to hospitals is the result of costs incurred by additional care necessary to treat patients who experience post-admission complications. Modifying the current HAC payment policy to quantify variation in the amount expended on postadmission complications and use that amount as the basis of payment reductions could help further cost containment while improving quality. The proposal differs from current HAC payment policy by:
% Expanding greatly the number of complications used to determine hospital payment adjustments; % Determining payment adjustments based upon a hospital's excess number of complications by comparing a hospital's actual complication rate to its risk-adjusted complication rate;
% Basing a hospital's payment adjustment on the estimated cost of each type of complication instead of the payment decrease associated with exclusion of a complication from MS-DRG assignment.
Together these reforms create a more comprehensive system for identifying complications and adjusting payments. We estimate the impact of these reforms on Medicare payments.
Reforming the Hospital-Acquired Conditions Policy
Replacing the current case-by-case payment adjustment mechanism with a rate-based approach yields numerous advantages. A summary of these advantages appears in Table 1 . Specifically, the table summarizes six key improvements that a rate-based approach offers in comparison to the current HAC policy. A rate-based approach does not require an assumption that complications are always preventable, and recognizes that patient susceptibility to a complication is related to the patient's severity of illness at time of admission. While it is desirable to establish a policy that incentivizes improvement of quality of care, it is not desirable to discriminate against hospitals that provide care to sicker patients. Calculating hospital complication rates, adjusted for patient mix, permits the comparison of an individual hospital's actual complication rate to a riskadjusted, expected complication rate. Deviation from the expected determines the number of complications that are considered ''excess.'' In this way, the assumption that a complication is always preventable is replaced by one that assumes for an equivalent mix of patients, hospitals should be expected to achieve a complication rate attained by their peers. This permits a greater range of complications to be considered. In Table 1 , these factors are referred to as ''Preventability'' (1) and ''Comprehensiveness'' (2).
A rate-based approach also can be integrated more effectively within the payment system (3). The HAC policy operates by excluding complication codes from DRG assignment. Claims with hospital-acquired complications face payment reductions only when exclusion of a complication code results in reassignment of the claim to a lowerpaying DRG. Any resulting reduction depends upon the difference in payment weights between the lower-and higher-paying DRG. This reduction may be further offset by an additional outlier payment. This results in the administration of a series of claim-specific payment adjustments of varying magnitude rather than a uniform series of known penalties. Since current HAC policy does not create a direct relationship between the cost of the complication and the extent of the payment reduction, the value obtained by reducing individual complications is obscured from hospitals and payers yet incorporated within DRG weights and IPPS payments. Conversely, a rate-based approach permits the estimated cost of a complication to be used as the basis for determining the magnitude of the payment adjustment associated with excess complications ). This approach increases transparency by explicitly identifying both the cost and relative frequency of complications (4).
A rate-based approach to payment better maintains incentives to code diagnoses completely (5). Under the HAC policy, the submission of a complication code can only result in reduced payment. Thus, there is no incentive to report complications, potentially causing the loss of important quality of care information. Under a rate-based approach, the reporting of complications could increase per case payments, and additionally could result in a rate-based payment reduction proportional to the frequency of a complication within a DRG. The net payment impact is far from obvious at the individual case level, thereby maintaining the financial incentive to report complications.
Finally, the rate-based approach better supports the goal of achieving behavioral change (6). By design, the HAC policy focuses on the failure of care in treating an individual patient. This assumes that the caregiving team, most notably the physician treating the patient, has provided substandard care. The behavioral response to the HAC approach is denial and defensiveness by the individual rather than institutional com- These five steps result in a single payment reduction factor for each hospital that would be applied to all admissions. This factor would be computed on the basis of a hospital's complication rate, which would be calculated from the most recent available historical data and prospectively applied in determination of DRG payment amounts for the following fiscal year.
Identifying Potentially Preventable Complications
HAC policy has identified 11 complications, developed for the Medicare population, that are excluded from MS-DRG assignment. As noted earlier, the payment impact of HAC policy is estimated at $20 million (.017%) of Medicare inpatient hospital expenditures. Despite the limited financial impact, treating complications as always preventable has been met with criticism (Pronovost, Goeschel, and Wachter 2008) . In contrast, the method of ''potentially preventable complications'' (PPCs) uses the present-on-admission (POA) indicator to identify inhospital complications arising after admission from the full range of secondary diagnoses reported by a hospital (Hughes et al. 2006) . The PPC methodology specifically excludes post-admission complications that are most likely to be a natural progression of a patient's underlying disease. In addition, the PPC methodology excludes patients with severe conditions (e.g., metastatic brain malignancy), for which preventability is difficult to assess. There are 64 types of PPCs that encompass the complete range of inpatient complications applicable to an all-payer population but limited to those complications that are potentially preventable and over which a hospital has a reasonable degree of influence or control. Our proposal to expand the number of post-admission complications included in the payment policy recognizes that complications are not always preventable, even with optimal care, and assumes that a comparison of risk-adjusted complication rates can provide the basis for determining excess complications upon which payment adjustments can be based.
Calculating Risk-Adjusted Complication Rates and Norms
Calculation of an expected rate of complications requires adjustment for the mix of patients and illness severity at the patient's time of admission. This is achieved by classifying patients with the all-patient refined diagnosis-related groups (APR DRGs) at time of admission (Averill et al. 2002) . APR DRGs use data from computerized discharge abstracts to assign patients to one of 314 base APR DRGs that are determined either by the principal diagnosis or, for surgical patients, the most important surgical procedure performed in an operating room. Each base APR DRG is subsequently divided into four severity of illness (SOI) levels, primarily determined by the interaction of secondary diagnoses that reflect both comorbid conditions and the severity of the underlying illness, creating the final set of 1,256 APR DRGs. The present-on-admission indicator is used to compute the admission APR DRG, which provides the benchmark for risk adjusting hospital PPC rates.
Comparing Hospitals' Risk-Adjusted PPC Rates
To calculate excess PPCs, we compare each hospital's actual number of PPCs to its riskadjusted expected number of PPCs. In order to compute the expected number of PPCs, it is necessary to establish a PPC norm. We take the PPC norm to be the PPC rate for each admission APR DRG based on an aggregated data set, which for this article is the national Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) data file for FY2009. We employ the PPC norm to predict a hospital's expected number of PPCs for each admission APR DRG using indirect rate standardization-that is, multiplying the norm PPC rate for each admission APR DRG by the number of patients in the hospital for that admission APR DRG.
Setting the norm PPC rate based on the average in each DRG blends together best and worst hospital performance and establishes the average as an acceptable, rather than optimal, performance standard. Therefore, instead of accepting the average PPC rate as a performance standard, an alternative ''best practice'' PPC norm can be created to set a long-term performance standard that identifies the subset of hospitals that have the lowest ratios of actual to expected PPC rates. Since the subsets of hospitals with the best relative PPC performance are likely to vary by the type of patients under consideration, we assign each of the 314 base APR DRGs to one of 35 different hospital service lines (e.g., cardiac surgery, obstetrics). For each service line, we identify the subset of hospitals with the best performance (i.e., actual PPCs lower than expected) for at least 25% of the overall patient population within the service line. In this way, a PPC best practice norm for each APR DRG in each service line is computed with each service line's PPC norm built from a different hospital subset. As a result, the PPC best practice norm for each admission APR DRG in each service line represents the PPC rate consistently achieved by the best performing hospitals.
Once again, we calculate the expected number of PPCs for each hospital using indirect rate standardization, but now applying the best practice PPC norm. A hospital's expected number of PPCs is the number that would occur if the hospital matched the performance of the best practice hospitals for its patient mix. It is unlikely that any single hospital has superior performance across all service lines; therefore, the actual number of PPCs will be higher than the expected number for the majority of hospitals. Thus, the difference between a hospital's actual and expected PPCs is the number of PPCs that could have been prevented if the hospital's performance was consistent with the best practice norm, and it provides a measure of the number of excess PPCs experienced by the hospital across all service lines.
Establishing the Magnitude of Hospital-Specific Payment Reductions
We calculate individual hospital performance by comparing the actual performance with expected performance, using the actual mix of admissions by APR DRG and the expected rate of PPC p within the APR DRGs, and accumulating the results over all PPCs. The expected rate can be the overall mean or a best practice standard based upon PPC performance.
To specify the formula, it is necessary to establish some terminology. Let N g,h be the number of admissions in APR DRG g to hospital h. Let P p,h be the number of incidences of PPC p in hospital h. Let C p be the estimated cost of PPC p. Let I g,p be the rate of incidence of PPC p in APR DRG g within the set of hospitals used to establish the standard rates. This is simply the number of cases of PPC p occurring in APR DRG g divided by the total number of admissions in APR DRG g, for the hospitals being used to set the standard.
For hospital h and PPC p the expected number of incidences of PPC p is:
where the sum is over all APR DRGs g:
If the actual number of cases of PPC p in hospital h is A p,h , then the excess number of cases of PPC p in hospital h is:
The projected cost associated with these excess cases is:
The total cost R of all excess PPCs at hospital h (R h ) is therefore given by:
where the sum is over all PPCs: If R h is negative then the hospital has a lower overall cost of PPCs than expected. For the purposes of this article, if the hospital payment reduction is negative, it is set to zero. This means that a hospital will not be given a payment increase if its actual PPC cost is less than the expected.
We obtain cost estimates for each PPC (C p ) through use of standard regression analysis. We get estimated PPC cost by first grouping each claim within an admission APR DRG, and then identifying the average level of increased cost associated with the presence of a postadmission complication. A complete description of the method employed to estimate PPC cost is given elsewhere ).
Incorporating the Payment Reduction into IPPS
Total payments to hospital h (T h ) are calculated as the sum of DRG payments made for all patients at hospital h and are set equal to the sum of all transfer-adjusted DRG case weights multiplied by the hospital's base rate. The PPC payment adjustment factor F h for a hospital is calculated as one minus the ratio of the PPC payment reduction R h to total hospital payments T h .
Thus, if the calculated cost of excess PPCs is 1% of total payments, the payment reduction factor applied to a hospital's base rate would be .99. The payment adjustment factor is computed based on the most recent available historical data and applied prospectively to the DRG payment amounts.
Data
We used MEDPAR data for FY2009 (October 1, 2008 to September 30, 2009 ), the first full year of HAC payment adjustment. Our analysis was applied to acute care hospitals falling under the Medicare IPPS. We evaluated the reporting of the POA data using an extensive set of edits. Hospitals that did not pass the POA edits were removed from the analysis database. These exclusions led to removal of 876 of the initial 3,549 hospitals (25%) in the analysis database.
Claims with a discharge status of transferred (code 02) or expired (code 20), claims with total charges greater than $2,000,000 or less than $200, and claims classified within ''error'' DRGs were excluded from the analysis. The final database contained 2,600 1 shortterm acute hospitals representing 8,175,339 Medicare patients. Of these patients, 10.5% (857,701) had one or more candidate postadmission complications. A candidate postadmission complication is a complication identified as a PPC after meeting global exclusion criteria. In total, 1,260,936 candidate post-admission complications were identified, falling to 886,640 (70%) PPCs after applying the exclusion criteria.
Estimates of PPC cost were made through statistical regression of the 8,175,339 Medicare claims. Medicare claims data provide hospital charges through which CMS recalibrates, as an annual update, relative weights for MS-DRGs. When calculating relative weights, CMS standardizes claim charges by applying hospital-specific factors for disproportionate share hospitals (DSH), indirect medical education (IME), the wage index, and the costs to charge ratio. We employed this approach to standardization of claims charges in the regression analysis with the effect that PPC coefficients were estimated in similar standardized magnitudes as the relative weights constructed for MS-DRGs. The standardization factors used within the anal-ysis were from the FY2010 Final Rule public use file, available from the CMS website. PPC cost estimates were calculated using admission APR DRGs version 27. The 8,175,339 claims were assigned to 1,063 of the 1,256 available APR DRGs. APR DRGs with high variability, defined within the regression analysis as falling outside a 95% confidence interval comparing the coefficient to its standard error (i.e., t-value , 1.96), were omitted from the final calculation. Final estimates of PPC cost were based upon 963 APR DRGs and 1,240,537 post-admission complications drawn from 7,797,598 claims.
We constructed a payment simulation to project inlier payments-payments made within the IPPS excluding additional payments for extraordinarily high-cost cases (outliers)-for each of the 8,175,339 claims using Medicare payment rules. The payment adjustment variables contained in the FY 2010 final rule were applied to the FY2010 operating ($5,223.14) and capital ($430.20) standard amounts to simulate equivalent CMS payments exclusive of any outlier component. This simulation resulted in an estimated $78,936,871,250 total inlier payments for the 8,175,339 claims. Table 2 contains regression results for PPCs estimated from the 7,797,598 retained claims. PPC descriptions are displayed in columns 1 and 2. The frequency of a post-admission complication, the estimate of its cost, and standard errors observed in the regression are given in columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively. An asterisk indicates that the ratio of coefficient to standard error (t-statistic) for the estimated PPC cost fell outside a 95% confidence interval, leading us to consider the estimate as unstable and resulting in the PPC being excluded from any subsequent payment analysis. The model, using admission DRGs and PPC coefficients, achieved an adjusted Rsquared value of 42.19% in fitting cost to claims. These findings are similar to other IPPS estimations that fit cost to claims using MS-DRGs (43%) obtained at discharge (Wynn and Scott 2007) . The final column summarizes the PPC's impact on total hospital cost. Thus PPC 5, ''pneumonia and other lung infections,'' is observed 91,573 times in the claims data, has an incremental cost estimate (coefficient) of $8,083, a standard error of $32, and constitutes more than $740 million or .99% of total hospital cost.
Results
The 50 PPC cost estimates shown in Table 2 , derived from the national MEDPAR data set, were compared to previous estimates for 49 PPCs (excluding PPC 26) and 47 PPCs (excluding PPCs 54 and 64) for Maryland and California, respectively Three PPCs shown in Table 2 , PPC 3 (acute pulmonary edema and respiratory failure without ventilation, .98%); PPC 5 (pneumonia and other lung infections, .99%); and PPC 24 (renal failure without dialysis, 1.12%), together contribute 3.09% to total hospital cost. Table 3 details the relationship between PPC cost and MS-DRG payment for these PPCs within five high-volume MSDRGs.
In Table 3 , MS-DRG 291 (heart failure and shock with major complication or comorbidity) is assigned to 174,064 claims within the database, with estimated inlier payments of $1,600,909,904. Within these 174,064 claims, PPCs 3, 5, and 24 occur 2,294; 3,498; and 11,186 times, respectively. The total estimated cost for these PPCs is the product of the individual PPC cost estimate, given in Table 2 , and the frequency of the PPC shown in Table 3 . Thus the estimated cost for PPC 3 within MS-DRG 291 is the product of $7,487 times 2,294 ($17,175,178). The estimated inlier payment for the 2,294 claims with PPC 3 within MS-DRG 291 is $21,331,836. For the combination of PPC 3 and MS-DRG 291, the PPC cost is estimated to be 80.51% of the amount paid for associated claims and 1.07% of total payment for MS-DRG 291.
We calculated the excess number of PPCs for each of the 2,600 hospitals in the analysis database. The impact on overall hospital payment using different PPC norms to calculate the expected number of PPCs in each hospital is shown in Table 4 . In Table 4 , the percentage of the payment adjustment is calculated as the ratio of the sum of estimated excess PPC cost to the sum of inlier payment ($66,046,887,387) prior to incorporating payment adjustment factors. In this way, both numerator and denominator are similarly standardized.
In Table 4 , the number of excess PPCs are calculated, either by: 1) summing the excess complications for hospitals only from PPCs in which the numbers of complications were greater than expected (a ''restricted PPC'' approach), or 2) calculating a ''net'' number of excess complications by summing across all PPCs, allowing the number of excess complications to be reduced by the number of complications that are below the expected number (an ''all PPC'' approach). Table 4 demonstrates that reductions based upon the best practice norm for the restricted (8.14%) and all DRG (8.13%) approaches converge. This results from best practice hospitals routinely achieving PPC rates close to zero within DRGs and thereby allowing no ''positive'' performance relative to the norm. The restricted PPC approach using the average PPC norm reduces payment by 2.09%. Figure 1 displays the distribution of individual hospital payment adjustment factors that comprise the 2.09% calculated for the restricted PPC approach using average performance as the norm. Figure 1 displays the distribution of hospitals and their payment adjustment factors, within ranges of 1.25%. The graph shows that 900 hospitals (35%) fall within the lowest band of 0% to 1.25%, with the maximum factor calculated at 14.35%. Table 5 summarizes the payment adjustment impacts upon hospital categories for the restricted PPC approach using average performance as the norm. The 2,600 hospitals in the analysis are distributed across 15 categories depending upon their Medicare disproportionate share hospital status and indirect medical education coefficients and their urban/rural status. Table 5 does not demonstrate wide divergence for any group from the 2.09% payment adjustment calculated across all hospitals, although rural hospitals appear to achieve lower PPC rates than their large urban counterparts.
Discussion
The quality of hospital care has a direct bearing on both a hospital's own financial performance and costs borne by the wider health system. Two exemplars of the close relationship between the cost and quality of care are readmissions and complications. Preventable readmissions result from deficiencies in care provided by hospitals and the wider system of community health infrastructure ). In contrast, complications that develop within the duration of a hospital admission are far more clearly attributable to the admitting facility. Given this higher level of unilateral control, improvements in performance should be more easily obtained. The creation of a risk-adjusted PPC performance norm offers both a way to communicate relative provider performance, identifying those areas in need of improvement, and to directly align performance with cost and payment. A payment reduction based on a best practice norm would be sufficient to lower overall hospital payments by 8.14% (Table 4) , while still providing additional payment to 16 (.6%) of the 2,600 hospitals.
The estimation of ''excess'' PPCs and their associated cost is based upon APR DRG risk adjustment. It is essential that risk adjustment for a hospital's patient mix be integral to the determination of financial rewards and penalties. Failure to perform adequate risk adjustment will incentivize hospitals to avoid the sickest patients who are at high risk of a complication, creating access problems, and unfairly representing hospital performance. Implementation of this approach would likely stimulate debate over the adequacy of the risk adjustment method and the definition of potentially preventable complications. This debate would likely extend to the appropriateness of using proprietary software. While such debate is to be expected, a benefit of having a Notes: CNS5central nervous system; GU5genitourinary; UTI5urinary tract infection; I&D5incision and drainage; mod5moderate; OR5operating room. * Denotes a ratio of coefficient to standard error (t-value) that falls outside a 95% confidence interval (i.e., we consider the estimate to be unstable). clinical categorical model is that definitions and reasoning are available in the form of supporting manuals, and that adjustments can be made to the algorithms in response to solid arguments, without jeopardizing the base stability of the underlying model. The approach described in this article develops a hospital PPC payment adjustment factor using Medicare's IPPS as an example. The calculation of the payment adjustment factor is independent of its application. That is, the calculation can be made independent of the claims processing system and the specific contractual arrangement between payer and hospital. This is because the discount factor calculation works as a discount percentage applied to total revenue. As a result, while a particular DRG classification system may be used to estimate PPC cost and excess, an alternative DRG system or payment method, such as per diem, can be used in conjunction with the calculated discount factor. Moreover, by establishing a framework to determine the frequency and cost of preventable complications, explicit terms governing their payment can be negotiated into commercial contracts. This is conceptually similar to liquidated damages clauses that routinely appear in contracts establishing a minimum standard of performance.
The use of historical data to establish the payment adjustment factor does not compromise the prospective nature of IPPS. The use of payment adjustment factors computed from historical data has always been a part of IPPS. The outlier thresholds, the indirect medical education factor, and the disproportionate share status are all derived from historical data and applied prospectively. Similarly, the driver of IPPS payment, the relative weight, is calculated from historical data and applied to future payment. The adoption of a hospital best practice standard or utilizing some other rate calculation to determine excess PPCs is a policy choice.
This means that there is both policy flexibility in determining the approach and no single correct approach. This type of ambiguity can result in problematic and acrimonious implementations if not comprehensively addressed. On the other hand, having policy choice gives flexibility and enables decision makers to balance high-quality goals with limiting penalties placed on hospitals by shifting between best practice and average norms. There are clear benefits to establishing longterm performance standards when implementing the initial system. This article proposes using a transparent, empirically derived measure that would be based on the outcomes consistently achieved by the best performing hospitals. It also should be understood that as performance improves, an updated norm will deliver a moving target since the norm is based upon the average of hospital performance. On one hand, moving targets might undermine the morale of quality improvement teams, but they also would deliver incentives for continuous improvement. For this reason, a schedule of updates would be encouraged, but not necessarily confined to a yearly cycle. The best practice standard, as modeled here, provides a realistic medium term return from a more comprehensive PPC payment policy without predicting the effects of dynamic change on achievable norms. The proposed standard is strict, but requires only that the 1,700 hospitals with payment adjustment factors outside the 0% to 1.25% range behave more like the 900 hospitals within it. It should also be remembered that the payment reductions associated with PPCs are based solely on the excess PPCs and not all complications; indeed, 30% of candidate post-admission complications were excluded through PPC logic.
One policy approach is to set a strict performance standard and either limit the maximum penalty or the global amount of payment reduction (i.e., .5% of payment) and then distribute this reduction relative to hospital performance. Such an approach has been taken by Maryland's HSCRC in the implementation of its PPC-based payment policy (Health Services and Costs Review Commission 2009).
We anticipate hospitals to have mixed coding and operational responses to the policy proposal. Hospitals may try to avoid coding secondary diagnoses as present on admission, thereby avoiding identification of PPCs. This strategy, however, would result in other problems for hospitals since, if pursued at volume, it would attract audit attention.
For example, the over-coding of diagnoses as present on admission would give the appearance of artificially high surgical risk taking. This potentially could raise problems not just with claims auditors, but also in cases with poor surgical outcomes that become involved in legal action. Similarly, for medical patients, questions will be raised over the timing of treatment initiation when diagnoses are inappropriately reported as present on admission. Thus, there are substantial counter balances to the financial incentive to code diagnoses as present on admission.
An alternative response could be to stop reporting complication codes. This again requires a selective strategy to avoid attracting immediate attention from auditors drawn to ''perfect'' hospitals. It requires further selection since financial gains do not necessarily result from not reporting complications. No financial gain is achieved through not coding complications present at time of admission. In fact, this can only lower DRG payment by reducing severity assignment. Similarly, PPC logic universally excludes identification of some complications as PPCs within some APR DRGs, and for short time intervals prior to their first reported onset in others. Hence, a selective strategy requires differentiated reporting of complications at admission or early onset, and by APR DRG. Further, unlike HAC policy, not reporting complications reduces both case payments and the riskadjusted PPC threshold. A selective strategy therefore needs to weigh the net effect of gains from averting PPC payment reductions, which are calculated at year end relative to a riskadjusted norm, against reduced DRG payments. After wading through this complexity a strategy is particularly unlikely to enhance revenue if payment policy establishes no positive amount for hospitals with PPC rates below the risk-adjusted norm. In short, the potential for a weak financial incentive to underreport complications, coupled with strong legal incentives to code completely, indicate that rational hospitals will continue to report them.
While reporting responses require consideration, the policy intent is for hospitals to focus upon reducing PPCs, thereby avoiding both financial penalties and the costs associated with them. Establishing financial penalties tied to performance standards, even standards routinely achieved by peer hospitals, may instead cause hospitals to abandon some services rather than improve clinical operations. This response may be exacerbated by the introduction of large performance penalties, the perceived cost of quality initiatives and uncertain ''moving'' targets obtained from frequent norm recalculation (discussed previously). These considerations require attention during implementation, with particular attention to the creation of a mechanism to disseminate ''best practice'' information so hospitals do not feel overwhelmed, or abandoned, in the challenge to improve.
The PPACA prohibits states from making Medicaid payments for ''medical assistance for health care-acquired conditions.'' Such a requirement may require substantial changes to Medicaid claims processing systems. Further, since the HACs have little applicability to the Medicaid population, the savings resulting from the implementation of this provision of the PPACA may not even cover the cost of implementation. Given the implementation costs, a more comprehensive identification of complications than HACs may be a more appropriate option for Medicaid.
Although reducing payments for complications can create immediate savings, future savings from lower complication rates are potentially much greater. Indeed, in 1983 IPPS was implemented on a budget neutral basis and the vast majority of savings resulted from subsequent changes in hospital behavior in response to the inherent IPPS incentives for efficiency. Similarly, the majority of savings associated with payment incentives for reducing complications should come from behavior changes that lead to a long-term reduction in complication rates.
The proposed rate-based payment adjustment allows the inclusion of complications that are ''potentially preventable.'' This sets forth a comprehensive approach that addresses many of the fair, but ultimately distracting, concerns in crafting policy to address paying for the cost of complications ). It should be remembered that Medicare payments are intended to pay for efficient costs after the effects of other allowable factors contributing to cost variation are removed (Department of Health and Human Services 1982) . As yet, no efficiency standard for costs related to complications has been put in place. This is especially important for PPCs since their cost is large, they directly link to the quality and safety of patient care, and the impact on total system cost of complications is magnified by subsequent care costs associated with ambulatory care and hospital readmission (Graves et al. 2008) .
Conclusion
This article proposes a refinement to Medicare's IPPS to incorporate a payment adjustment for hospitals with excessive rates of PPCs. This is achieved by explicitly linking PPC costs with the MS-DRG payment system. This type of payment system reform can lead to increased value from our health care expenditures.
Financial risk imposed by the payment policy needs to be substantial enough to motivate hospitals to make the investments necessary to improve outcomes. Use of a riskadjusted best practice norm to identify excess complications would result in an 8.14% reduction in hospital payments due to the occurrence of PPCs. This contrasts with the current HAC policy that, after ''denying any additional payment'' for HACs, projects a payment reduction of only .02% ($20 million).
There are clear human and financial costs resulting from the prevalence of PPCs. It is important not to lose sight of these effects within the global goal of health care reform.
Notes
1 Maryland hospitals routinely fail to report POA data to CMS; Puerto Rico hospitals were excluded as a payment model simplification.
